"The moment they take away your control over pricing, you're no longer a seller. You're just a supplier, and the marketplace decides who sells, how much they sell, and how much they earn."
Artur Ivashin — managing partner at Mebel Via holding (brands Mebel Via and Stolline) and CEO of Benelli Group — dropped that line in an interview with agency Adgasm on vc.ru. He speaks from inside a major manufacturer: the group's own factories produce 80% of its retail assortment and 50% of its online sales, it runs dedicated furniture fulfillment centers in Moscow and Krasnodar, and it builds custom analytics tools in-house.
Their approach to numbers is blunt. Ivashin laughs at SaaS tools promising to calculate marketplace unit economics "within 3% accuracy" — furniture simply doesn't have an extra 3% margin to spare. The holding's internal analytics track losses down to 2 rubles per 40 million in turnover. That strict math forced the company to rebuild its entire channel mix, from AI search to short videos replacing million-ruble search ad bills.
The Flat-Rate Trap: Why a 200-kg Wardrobe Breaks the Marketplace Model
Marketplaces still generate about half of Mebel Via's sales. The company entered them ten years ago and has kept positive unit economics the whole time. Yet growing at the pace platforms demand for custom terms no longer works because the marketplace dictates prices. Ivashin compares it to IKEA: the Swedish giant started in Russia partly with their factories, counted every kopeck, and decided how much suppliers were allowed to make. Marketplaces do the exact same thing today.
Furniture's main problem on general marketplaces is simple physics. Fee structures are built for compact items, and oversized goods (KGT) don't fit:
- Shipping. Moving a 200-kg wardrobe from Moscow to Penza can't cost 4,000 rubles. On Ozon and Wildberries, oversized logistics depend on volume, inter-cluster routes, and warehouse multipliers — and if a buyer cancels, return shipping falls on the seller and wipes out the margin.
- Storage. One pallet of furniture takes up the same warehouse square footage as a pallet of smartphones or cosmetics, even though the value on that pallet differs by tens or hundreds of times.
Warehouse fulfillment adds another headache. Most sellers use FBO (inventory sits in the marketplace's warehouse, which packs and ships it) or FBS (inventory stays with the seller or partner and ships per order). Furniture rarely ships in one box, though, so the holding's fulfillment centers run multi-box fulfillment, tracking stock across complete sets so a customer doesn't receive a cabinet without its doors.
As a result, the universal "delivered tomorrow" standard turns into a markup for thin air. Ivashin puts it bluntly: "Do you need a dresser tomorrow, or can you wait until Saturday and pay less? I think you'll survive until Saturday." When purchasing power tightens, delivery speed loses to price.
Ivashin predicts marketplaces will lose around 30% of furniture turnover over the next three years to specialized platforms and niche fulfillment providers with lower fees, storage, and shipping rates. The shift already shows in Yandex Search: for "buy toothpaste" or "hairbrush," marketplaces still own the top spots, but for "buy a bed" they've mostly vanished after cutting furniture search ads.
So why does Mebel Via still keep half its sales there? Simple: marketplaces became a factory-loading conveyor belt. Steady order volume spreads out overhead, lowers unit production cost, and boosts profit in their own direct channels.
200K Content vs. Millions in Yandex Direct: The New Media Mix
Four years ago, the company learned a hard lesson. Before Google pulled out of ads in Russia, almost all traffic came from Google, they barely worked with Yandex, and they lacked branded traffic (people searching the company name directly instead of "buy a sofa"). When Google left, Yandex bids spiked and they had no demand cushion.
Today "old-school" SEO and Yandex Direct still work, but Direct budgets run into millions of rubles while delivering noticeably fewer clicks for the money. So the team shifted focus to two much cheaper channels.
First is GEO (Generative Engine Optimization) — tuning the site and content for AI-generated answers. Shoppers increasingly consult DeepSeek and ChatGPT before big purchases, and the team actively works to make AI view their site as a reliable source worth recommending. Results are already tangible: roughly 10% of website traffic comes from AI search.
Second is organic content and short video: Instagram* Reels, posts, giveaways, Dzen, and Yandex Rhythm. Yandex Rhythm is Yandex's visual content-and-commerce feed (photos, carousels, and clips with direct product links) whose posts appear on Yandex's homepage and in the Products tab, without tying reach strictly to follower counts.
Even after restrictions on Instagram*, the company saw no traffic drop there — they run zero paid ads on it and spend only on production. The budget contrast is stark: while Direct eats millions, shooting solid short videos costs around 200,000 rubles. By Ivashin's estimate, alternative channels combined — GEO, social media, Dzen, and Yandex Rhythm — already match Direct's traffic volume at a fraction of the cost per visit.
Three Owned Stores, Zero Tenders, and Quitting TV
Owned retail makes up under 10% of sales — just three standalone street-retail stores (with direct street entrances rather than leased mall booths) totaling around 6,000 square meters.
They kept only products that sell poorly on a screen: custom kitchens requiring blueprints and consultations, plus high-end sofas and mattresses. As Ivashin notes, if someone is ready to spend 100,000 rubles on a mattress, they want to lie on it first rather than click "buy now." The company isn't rushing to advertise retail either. Mall furniture sections are nearly empty while rents stay high, and Ivashin expects a wave of closures early next year and in spring. Owning their buildings lets them wait out the storm and pick up remaining offline demand.
Everything uncontrollable was cut without regret. They dropped TV and seasonal brand flights. From 2021 to 2023 they advertised on TV (including alongside Sber) while marketplaces co-funded airtime, but now prices are up and returns are questionable. They were even stricter with tenders, walking away from both government and corporate bids despite once supplying furniture for the Sochi Olympics. Mass-production factories don't fit tender rush jobs ("jump in fast, don't calculate, win, and figure it out later") followed by exhaustive accounting audits — leaving hundreds of millions in revenue and "zero real profit."
The 5% Rule: Why Only Giants Get to Blame the Economy
Asked the classic question of whether we're in a crisis, Ivashin shrugs: "I'm 40, and something is always happening. Right now it's like this. Later it'll be different."
To end excuses, he offers the 5% rule: as long as your market share is under 5%, macroeconomic conditions don't matter. Using a purely hypothetical thought experiment (stressing it's math for illustration, not financial reporting), he pictures a 5-billion-ruble company in a 1-trillion-ruble market. Even if the market shrinks to 700 billion, is there really no room left to double your sales?
Only super-giants like Askona or HOFF — companies with 10–15% market share and over 50 billion rubles in annual revenue — physically move in lockstep with the whole industry. Everyone else is held back not by macroeconomics, but by slow reaction times, sloppy math, and the habit of pouring budgets into old ad auctions when far cheaper channels sit right next to them.
*Instagram belongs to Meta, which is recognized as an extremist organization and banned in the Russian Federation.

